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Abstract: 
 
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sent shock waves across political classes globally and 
prompted debates about whether his ‘America first’ agenda threatened the liberal 
international order.  During his first year in office, Trump seemed determined to undermine 
the hallmarks of the liberal international order:  democracy, liberal economics and 
international cooperation.  So, are we witnessing the emergence of a “post-liberal” and 
“post-American” era?  Four sources of evidence help frame – if not answer - the question:  
history, the crisis of liberal democracy, Trump’s world view, and the power of civil society 
(globally and nationally) to constrain any US President.  They yield three main judgements.  
First, continuity often trumps change in US foreign policy.  Second, the liberal international 
order may have been more fragile pre-Trump than was widely realised.  Third, American 
power must be put at the service of its own democracy if the US is to become the example 
to the world it used to be.   
 
 Keywords: US foreign policy, US politics, liberal order, multipolarity 
 
Any investigation of the current role of the United States (US) in the liberal international order must 
begin by acknowledging the utter shock to which many Americans and political classes globally 
awoke on 9 November 2016, when Donald Trump’s election as US President was confirmed.  Not 
only did nearly all pollsters and political professionals consider Trump’s possible path to victory so 
narrow – everything that went right for him in battleground states had to go right – that it was 
almost certain that Hillary Clinton would be elected.1  The shock never really subsided during 
Trump’s first year in office.  Trump’s ‘America First’ campaign rhetoric quickly took on tangible 
foreign policy consequences.  Even before taking office, Trump announced that the US would pull 
out of the painstakingly negotiated Transpacific Partnership (TPP).  He repeatedly threatened to do 
the same with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  One of his first acts as President 
was to try to impose a travel ban on nationals of seven mainly Muslim countries.  Then came the 
bombshell of US withdrawal from the Paris agreement on climate change.   
                                                          
1 As of 30 October 2017, nearly a year after the 2016 US election, the highly influential New York Times website 
“The Upshot:  Who Will be President?” was still listing its 8 November 2016 estimation that Clinton’s chances 
of winning were 85%.  See https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-
forecast.html.   
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Reports in summer 2017 that North Korea had successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead 
on top of multiple successful long distance missile tests led to fears of real bombshells falling.  
Trump thundered that a US military response was “locked and loaded” and North Korean 
provocation would “be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen”.2  Soon afterwards, one 
(unabashedly liberal) commentator termed it an “inescapable fact” that “on November 9th, the 
United States elected a dishonest, inept, unbalanced, and immoral human being as its President and 
Commander-in Chief”.3  Trump’s America appeared to have abandoned the traditional US role of 
bolstering and reinforcing the global liberal order at which the first postwar US Secretary of State 
claimed – with considerable pride and justification – he had been Present at the Creation.4  In fact, 
Trump seemed bent on destroying it.  Was that inescapable, too? 
 It obviously is risky to try to extrapolate from a sample size of one year to judge whether the 
present era marks the beginning of what Riccardo Alcaro terms a “post-liberal” and “post-American” 
age in his Introduction to this issue.5  A more profitable exercise is to consider what evidence we 
have about factors determining how the tectonic plates of the international order may be shifting 
now and might shift in the future.  One source of evidence is history, especially the relative weight of 
agency versus structure in the evolution of US foreign policy (see the first section below).  Another is 
the rise of multipolarity as an indelible trend in recent history.  Relatedly, we have had ample 
indication over time to judge whether and how the emergence of non- or quasi-democracies as 
rising powers constitutes “a wider crisis across the liberal democratic world”6 (second section).  
Accordingly, we have to consider whether Trump is, according to the leading liberal IR scholar John 
Ikenberry, “less a cause than a consequence of the failings of liberal democracy”.  Judging whether 
he is right means interrogating how and why escalating nationalism, populism, inequality and 
protectionism have fused in Trump’s worldview and with what consequences for the global order 
(considered in the third section).  Finally, we can reflect on how state institutional or non-state 
actors – civil society, whether domestic (in the US) or global – might deploy their own considerable 
power to shape US foreign policy outcomes (the last section).   
No one can yet know whether Alcaro’s vision of a “post-liberal, post-American” future is 
prescient or not.  But he is hardly alone in thinking, along with the vastly experienced US diplomat 
and analyst Richard Haas, that “it is difficult not to take seriously the possibility that one historical 
                                                          
2 Quoted in CNN, “Trump Warns North Korea:  US Military ‘Locked and Loaded’, 11 August 2017, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/10/politics/trump-north-korea/index.html. 
3 Remnick, “The Divider”, 28. 
4 Acheson, Present at the Creation. 
5 Alcaro, “Liberal Order and its Contestations”, x ???. 
6 Ikenberry, “Plot Against American Foreign Policy”, 3 (same reference for the next sentence). 
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era is ending and another beginning”.7  We can at least begin to get an analytical handle on how 
likely such prognostications might be right, and to what extent they might be right.  In other words, 
how much less liberal and less American is the next historical era likely to be?  We may well be living 
through a period of crisis in which the postwar liberal order faces unprecedented peril.  Equally, 
connections that bind together the liberal order – arguably wider, deeper and denser by an order of 
magnitude than ever before in history – may mean it is more durable than it sometimes appears.   
 
The liberal order and IR theory:  agency vs structure 
There are few other subjects of study in the political world in which history becomes more of a 
testing ground for the relative explanatory power of agency – of individuals or states to influence 
their environment – as opposed to structure:  environments that contain pressures that bear down 
so hard on states or statespersons that they effectively determine their behaviour.  Structure is 
usually the winner in international relations (IR) theory.  Most IR theorists describe, explain and 
predict outcomes in international politics based on the distribution of power in the international 
system of states.  Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism is perhaps the most widely-debated variant of 
‘structural realism’ in that it assumes that states are unitary-rational actors competing in a state of 
international anarchy for power.8  Since states are functionally similar in pursuing security in an 
insecure world, they may even be described (theoretically) as “billiard balls”.  What is inside them – 
democratic or authoritarian regimes, wise or foolish statespersons and so on – literally drops out of 
the theoretical explanation.  Structure,  determined by how power is distributed between states, is 
(nearly) all that matters.   
 Of course, theoretical assumptions are not descriptions of reality.  Moreover, liberal and 
constructivist IR theorists challenge many (neo)realist assumptions about structure and agency.  For 
them, the two not only shape but create each other.  In other words, agents and structure are 
“mutually constitutive: states make the structures, and structure makes states”.9  So, by extension 
(in the classic constructivist view), “anarchy is what states make of it”.10   
For all of their differences, a leading (liberal) theorist insists that all IR theories are “systemic 
theories in a Waltzian sense”.11  That is, all theorise on the basis of the distribution of power 
between states, thus privileging structure over agency. Crucially, however, liberals (and 
                                                          
7 Haas, A World in Disarray, xii.  It should be noted that Haas advised Trump on foreign policy during the 2016 
campaign and was even considered for an appointment in his administration, although Haas subsequently 
soundly criticised the administration for its unprofessional ‘ad-hoc-ery’ in making foreign policy.  See 
Haberman, “Donald Trump Held Briefing with Haas”, Appelbaum, “Trump’s Foreign Policy ‘Adhocracy’”. 
8 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
9 Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem”, 214. 
10 Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it”. 
11 Moravcsik, “Liberal international relations theory”, 7. 
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constructivists) take a different view than realists about how structure constrains agents in modern 
IR.  The liberal order created in the postwar period features a more or less robust international 
society.  Recalling Vincent’s memorable analogy, it acts as an egg carton that protects states (cast as 
fragile eggs) from smashing into each other and thus cracking and disintegrating.12  International 
society is buttressed by advanced regional cooperation and international organisations and law that 
have steadily gained in strength, authority and legitimacy.  The liberal international system of states 
limits the agency of potential change agents such as Trump because all states, including powerful 
ones like the US, benefit from its existence.   
 If we take 1945 as ‘year zero’ of the current international order  and then trace its evolution 
from there, we could plausibly conclude that a progressively more forceful liberal structure emerged 
that increasingly constrained the choices of agents or statespersons.  That was the case at least for 
one side in a bipolar Cold War, the alliance of (mostly) democratic states consisting of the West plus 
Australasian states including Japan.  On the other side, after (first) the Warsaw Pact and (then) the 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1989-91, virtually all states sought to become members of the liberal 
order.  After all, joining was voluntary and the promise of peace and prosperity incentivised states to 
accept its rules and norms of behaviour.  From that point onwards, most statespersons embraced 
the three hallmarks of the liberal international order:  democracy, liberal economics and 
international cooperation.  
The result, significantly spurred by technological advance, became a movement for which 
the shorthand term is globalisation.  Realists such as Waltz questioned how far globalisation really 
had advanced, as well as whether it was powerful or durable enough to qualify anarchy.13  But he 
and other realists were swimming against a tide of claims that the liberal order had advanced to the 
point where its norms eclipsed and delegitimised the inter-state conflict that was endemic to earlier 
eras of anarchy. 
 Of course, intensified intra-state conflict was an almost inevitable consequence of the end of 
the Cold War.  States whose boundaries had been more or less randomly drawn in the past – 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq – descended into civil wars (in the case of Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq, forestalled only by brutal internal repression).  For a time, US-led humanitarian intervention to 
try to limit the bloodshed of internecine conflicts appeared to become something like a norm of the 
liberal order.  It even provided a (flimsy) measure of liberal political cover to the US-led invasion of 
Afghanistan after the terrorist atrocities in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (9/11).  
The George W. Bush administration extolled the overthrow of a Taliban government that repressed 
                                                          
12 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, 123-5. 
13 Waltz, “Globalization and governance”. 
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women and imposed a ruthless form of fundamentalist Islamist rule.  In retrospect, however, the 
contemporary debate about the durability of the liberal order is rooted in an eventuality for which 
that order was entirely unequipped:  a massive terrorist attack by a stateless network on what many 
considered the most asymmetrically powerful hegemon in modern history. 
 The list of liberal norms that were quickly jettisoned by the US was breath-taking.  A US 
President declared a ‘war on terror’; that is, on a tactic instead of an enemy.  Other states were 
“with or against” the US in the prosecution of the war, regardless of how Washington chose to 
prosecute it.  The Geneva Convention and other landmark human rights agreements were brazenly 
violated in the treatment of enemy combatants and resort to extreme surveillance methods.  The 
2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), unveiled one year and one day after 9/11, arrogated to the 
US the right to pre-emptive military action against perceived threats purely on the basis of US 
intelligence and without obligation to consult other states.14  American hegemony obviously entailed 
special privileges enjoyed only by the US.  But the list of privileges never included the ability to act as 
an agent untethered by the globally accepted constraints of the liberal order without undermining 
its structural foundations. 
 One consequence was that after 9/11, competition between competing traditional doctrines 
of US foreign policy was turned upside down.  Mead handily identifies four discrete visions of 
America’s role in the world.15  The first is Hamiltonianism, inspired by the first US Treasury Secretary, 
which prioritises America’s international commercial interests, embraces a balance of power, and 
takes an essentially realist view of IR.  The second is Wilsonianism, the brainchild of Woodrow 
Wilson, which seeks a global civil society and pursues international cooperation, democracy and 
human rights with almost missionary zeal.  Third is Jeffersonianism, based on the third US 
President’s conviction that foreign entanglements should never be allowed to damage precious US 
political institutions and traditions; put simply:  “the object of foreign policy should be to defend 
[American] values at home rather than extend them abroad”.16  Fourth, Jacksonianism embraces the 
militaristic, hawkish, populist and honour-bound doctrine of the seventh US President, Andrew 
Jackson.  Mead ascribes what he views as the success of the US as a global power to healthy debate 
and competition between these four schools.  They ensure that US foreign policy is a 
“symphony...rather than a solo”.17 
However, post-9/11, the Bush administration appeared to embrace a sort of Wilsonianism 
on steroids:  a unipolar vision in which American power would be used aggressively to combat 
                                                          
14 Dannreuther and Peterson, Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations. 
15 Mead, Special Providence. 
16 Ibid., 175. 
17 Ibid., 54. 
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tyranny, promote freedom and fight a war on terrorism.  Its leading neoconservatives (Vice-
President Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz) blithely predicted that Iraqis would greet invading US troops with flowers.  Freed of 
Saddam’s tyranny, Iraq could quickly become a “beacon of democracy”.18  The demonstration effect 
would unleash a democratic “wave of change” in the Middle East.19  One group of liberal IR thinkers, 
with considerable and palpable anger, poured scorn on Bush’s foreign policy for tragically betraying 
Wilson’s vision of a multilateral, cooperative, rules-based order.20   
We now know that the link of causation between 9/11 and Saddam’s Iraq was made almost 
immediately by Bush’s neoconservative foreign policy advisors.21  The disastrous aftermath of the 
US-led 2003 invasion was mirrored by a surge in anti-Americanism globally that became a primary 
concern of IR scholars within a few years.22  The election of Barack Obama as US President in 2008 – 
and again in 2012 – was in key respects a balm to America’s wounded international reputation.  Yet, 
given that his rise from obscurity to the White House occurred largely because of his self-
identification as the anti-war candidate, it was always likely that he would leave office as the first 
post-hegemonic US President.  Every attempt Obama made to reassert US global leadership can be 
matched with a case of retrenchment.  Assertive US diplomacy on climate change sits next to 
Obama’s diplomatic disengagement from Iraq – by one view “his only interest in Iraq was ending the 
war”23 – thus creating the conditions for the rise of ISIS in 2013.  Obama’s (reluctant) commitment to 
NATO airstrikes on Libya in 2011 (with the US “leading from behind”) contrasts with his undelivered 
commitment to attack Assad’s Syria if it crossed his “red line” and used chemical weapons against its 
own people.  Revealingly, those straining to identify an “Obama doctrine” by the end of his 
Presidency were left with little more than his own insistence “that the first task of an American 
President in the post-Bush international arena was don’t do stupid sh_t’”.24   
 Realists can claim analytical purchase on Obama’s failure as a change agent in US foreign 
policy, as well as the fraying of the liberal international order.  After all, international politics is a 
realm of “recurrence and repetition”25 in which structure trumps agency and any notion that states 
can institutionalise cooperation in the pursuit of absolute gains is illusory.  Meanwhile, liberals are 
almost desperately left to insist that “in terms of wealth creation, the provision of physical security 
and economic stability, and the promotion of human rights and political protection, no other 
                                                          
18 George W. Bush quoted in Khalaf, “Iraq’s difficult decade of democracy”.   
19 UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw quoted in BBC News, “Iraq helped ‘Mid-East democracy’”.   
20 Ikenberry et al., Crisis of American Foreign Policy. 
21 Woodward, Bush at War, 42. 
22 See Farber, What They Think of Us; Katzenstein and Keohane, Anti-Americanism in World Politics. 
23 Sky, The Unravelling, 338. 
24 Goldberg, “The Obama doctrine”. 
25 Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?”, 123-5. 
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international order in history comes close” to the present one.26  Still, Obama clearly presided over a 
period of declining US ownership of the international order, not least because of secular changes in 
the distribution of power amongst the components in an increasingly multipolar world. 
 
Multipolarity:  new winners, old losers? 
In 2004, a leading (liberal) intellectual and historian, Timothy Garten Ash, published a prophetic 
work on the “crisis of the West” post-Iraq.  He was ahead of the curve in foreseeing that “the old 
Atlantic-centred West, which has been shaping the world since about 1500, probably has no more 
than twenty years left in which it will still be the main world-shaper”.27  Most of that time has now 
passed. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) is still reeling and presently fixated on ‘Brexit’:  the 
shock vote of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU in its June 2016 referendum.  There is no sign 
that Trump’s America will seek to renew the transatlantic alliance, or even its alliance with the UK, 
especially after slapping more than 200 per cent tariffs on Bombardier, a Canadian airline 
manufacturer that employs 4000 workers in the UK’s economic backwater of Northern Ireland.   
Trump’s refusal even to mention the US Article 5 Treaty commitment (an attack on one is 
attack on all) at the unveiling of a memorial to the victims of 9.11 at NATO’s new headquarters in 
Brussels – despite agreeing with his foreign policy team that it would feature in his speech28 – 
marked a truly low moment in US-European relations.  Soon afterwards, Germany’s Chancellor 
Angela Merkel spoke for many in Europe in urging “we must fight for our future on our own, for our 
destiny as Europeans…The times in which we could fully rely on others – they are pretty much 
over”.29  There were at least rumblings about a possible renewal of the EU post-Brexit and following 
the election of the strongly pro-EU Emmanuel Macron as French President in 2017.  They were 
reflected (for instance) in the commitment in the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy (its equivalent of the US 
NSS) to European “strategic autonomy”.  But whether or not Europe is on a long-term downward 
spiral in terms of its international power (as many think it is), the continent seems to be drifting 
towards more independence in IR because Trump’s America First agenda effectively precludes close 
transatlantic ties. 
   If the West’s collective decline signals a global power shift, then there’s little debate about 
to where much of the power is shifting:  Xi Jinping’s China.  By October 2017, The Economist was 
unqualified in deeming Xi “the world’s most powerful man”.30  The five-yearly Communist Party 
                                                          
26 Ikenberry, “Plot against American foreign policy”, 3. 
27 Garton Ash, Free World, 192. 
28 Glasser, “Trump team blindsided by NATO speech”. 
29 Quoted in Smale and Erlanger. “Merkel is looking past Trump”.  
30 The Economist, “The world’s most powerful man”, 14 October 2017, 11. 
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Congress of that month consolidated Xi’s power as no Chinese leader had achieved post-Mao by 
writing his name and dogma into China’s constitution.  In a nearly three and half hour speech to 
open the congress, Xi highlighted how China had “taken a driving seat in international cooperation 
on climate change”.   He also insisted that China did not seek hegemony, but equally vowed that “no 
one should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests”.31 
 Xi’s assertiveness seemed carefully calibrated to the dawn of the Trump era.  He had earlier 
endeared himself to global elites at the January 2016 Davos World Economic Forum by staking 
China’s claim to be a champion of globalisation, free trade and the Paris climate change agreement.  
Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative promised huge investments in railways, ports, power 
stations and other infrastructure that would create jobs and growth across the Eurasian continent.  
It acted to reinforce the impression that the power shift towards China was mostly economic, 
involving little additional ‘soft power’, or the ability to attract other states and convince them to 
want for themselves what China wanted for them.32   
But China may now wield more soft power than might be assumed, especially given the 
emergence of Trump’s America.  At home, Xi has tightened controls over China’s nascent civil 
society, presided over increased human rights abuses, and kept the Chinese economy firmly in 
control of state-run enterprises.  The effect has been to reinforce the rise of a new competitor to 
liberal democracy as a political form that states can emulate:  the ‘Chinese model’ combining 
authoritarianism, state-led capitalism and nationalism.  After all, no other system in history has ever 
successfully pulled so many people out of poverty.  Any soft power that Xi’s China wields has flowed 
from that empirical fact. 
For his part, Donald Trump seems to admire Xi’s ability to impose his personal will on China, 
phoning to congratulate him on the results of the 2017 party congress ahead of his own visit to 
Beijing.  If we are concerned with how the US under Trump is positioning itself relative to China, two 
things seem clear.  One is that Trump’s personal admiration for Xi creates scope for compromise, if 
not cooperation, between the world’s two most powerful states.  A second is that nothing about Xi’s 
China suggests that multipolarity is not on the rise as a fundamental fact of international politics. 
 If China’s rise signals a reversal of the postwar era’s progressive strengthening of 
international society – and a consequent loss of predictability – then the case of Russia is much less 
ambiguous.  Russian military adventurism in, first, Georgia, and then, Ukraine in the early 21st 
century signalled the dawn of what many termed a “new Cold War” in Europe.33  Allegations of 
                                                          
31 Quoted in Phillips, “Xi Jinping hails ‘new era’”. 
32 Nye, Soft Power. 
33 One example amongst many is Osnos et al., “Trump, Putin and New Cold War”.  See also Lucas, The New 
Cold War. 
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Russian interference in the 2016 US election, still under investigation at time of writing, are both 
astounding and unsurprising.  Astounding because, if substantiated, the deployment of an 
authoritarian tactic entirely unthinkable in the modern liberal international order could mark a 
major escalation in a new Cold War.34  Unsurprising because of the public statement of Vladimir 
Putin’s choice for chief of the Russian army, Valery Gerasimov, in 2013 that stressed a “blurring of 
the differences between war and peace…The emphasis in the methods of confrontation being 
employed is shifting toward widespread use of political, economic, information…and other non-
military measures”.35 
 From one perspective, Putin’s “managed democracy” that mimics democratic parties, 
institutions and elections while the Kremlin tightly controls both politics and, perhaps more 
importantly, the economy has been necessitated by its declining, pre-modern economy and falling 
standards of living.  With energy prices low and genuine Western solidarity producing economically 
painful sanctions after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin is playing a game he will inevitably 
lose.  He has had to distract Russians with patriotic adventurism abroad, including in Ukraine, on 
Russia’s border with NATO and in Syria’s civil war.  Russia is powerful enough to violate the norms of 
the liberal international order.  But not with impunity and not for much longer.  Short-term 
geopolitical muscle-flexing creates the appearance of Russian success in pushing towards a new 
multipolar order but shrouds a Russia that is fundamentally in decline. 
 From another perspective, Putin’s methods have found admirers in EU countries such as 
Hungary, Slovakia and even – despite its profound suspicion of Russia – Poland.  Governments in all 
three states have shifted towards “illiberal democracy”, to use the term that Victor Orban, the 
autocratic Hungarian Prime Minister, openly avowed as his aspiration.  Revealingly, Orban’s most 
focused speech on the concept – the basis of which was ethnic nationalism – was delivered in 2014 
in Romania to an audience of ethnic Hungarians.  The speech excoriated liberal values for 
encouraging “corruption, sex and violence” and condemned non-governmental organisations as 
“paid political activists who are attempting to enforce foreign interests here in Hungary [sic].”  Orban 
asserted that “the stars of the international analysts today are Singapore, China, India, Russia and 
Turkey”.36 
 Two questions arise from such a claim and list, even if the latter forms an ersatz group 
(outright or quasi-dictatorships along with democratic India).  First, is the liberal international order 
being undermined from within by its constituent states?  Has Huntington’s “third wave” of 
                                                          
34 Far less so, of course, during the Cold War international order when the US interfered in multiple democratic 
elections.   
35 Wright, All Measures Short of War, 765-72. 
36 Quoted in Freedom House, Breaking Down Democracy, 35. 
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democratisation37 now gone into reverse as more states emulate autocratic methods?  Second, even 
if its main members do not match Orban’s “stars”, are the agents of multipolarity accelerating their 
rise via concerted action by the so-called BRICs:  Brazil, Russia, India and China (sometimes including 
South Africa – BRICS)?  And, as an ancillary question, are Trump’s own autocratic inclinations likely 
to fuel both of these fires? 
 The first question must be taken seriously.  According to Freedom House, the democracy 
watchdog that receives US government funding but claims independence, more states have 
restricted than increased democratic freedoms every year since 2008.  By its count, at least 25 fewer 
truly free democracies existed in 2016 than at the turn of the century.38  At China’s October 2017 
National Congress, Xi Jinping explicitly claimed that the Chinese model offered “a new option for 
other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their 
independence”.39  Independence seemed a code word for autonomy from Western, particularly 
American, influence.  A 2017 Freedom House report on “modern authoritarianism”, which mostly 
focused on China and Russia, starkly stated that “a basic assumption behind the report is that 
modern authoritarianism will be a lasting feature of geopolitics” and that, moreover, “[a]uthoritarian 
systems will seek not just to survive, but to weaken and defeat democracy around the world”.40  The 
stakes may be higher than ever before for the ability of US democracy to demonstrate its resilience 
to the world under Trump. 
 The second question – ostensibly, are the BRICs a true alliance? – is easier to answer.  As 
early as 2012, a senior Morgan Stanley analyst put the commonly-shared and rapid rise of the BRIC 
states down to an unusual and fleeting set of economic circumstances in the preceding decade.41  Of 
course, the convening of annual BRICS summits beginning in 2009, and the subsequent creation of a 
BRICs Development Bank in 2013 (to rival the International Monetary Fund) encouraged the rest of 
the world to sit up and take notice.  But the BRICS Development Bank soon had to compete for 
finance with the China-inspired Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, after the latter was created in 
2015.  More generally, all of the BRICS countries face their own severe domestic political problems.42  
Put simply, their interests in IR sometimes overlap, but are by no means identical.  As Alcaro puts it, 
“The BRICS format…is no check on Western power.  It is a means to manage inter-BRICS relations – 
                                                          
37 Huntington, The Third Wave. 
38 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017. 
39 Quoted in Phillips, “Xi Jinping hails ‘new era’”. 
40 Freedom House, Breaking Down Democracy, 4. 
41 Sharma, Broken BRICs. 
42 Peterson et al., “Multipolarity, multilateralism and leadership”, 52-4. 
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which entail a good deal of competition, particularly along the Russia-China and China-India 
borders”.43   
 The ancillary question – what might be the knock-on effects of Trump’s election and 
authoritarian sensibilities – is considerably more complicated.  We need to reflect on both what his 
election means for the liberal international order as well as the robustness of American democracy 
to mitigate any tendency of his Presidency to undermine it.  These two analytical tasks are tackled in 
the sections that follow. 
  
Trump and the liberal democratic crisis  
In a provocative analysis of the implications of Trump’s election (of special interest to some readers 
of this journal), Clementi and colleagues argue that it marked the “Italianization” of American 
politics.44  Rejecting any suggestion that Trump’s rise could result in Mussolini-style authoritarianism, 
they instead find clear analogies between Trump and Italy’s longest-serving contemporary prime 
minister:  Sylvio Berlusconi.  Both embraced similar brands of populism, shared personality traits, 
personalised politics as rarely seen before, and leveraged to their advantage deep anti-
establishment sentiment.   
 Whether we accept the analogy or not, there are clear parallels between Berlusconi and 
Trump in how their domestic political programmes inevitably had/have consequences for foreign 
policy.  While Berlusconi actively supported the US-led invasion of Iraq, his brand of politics also 
involved cosying up to Putin’s Russia and fomenting the rise in Euroscepticism in Italy.  In Trump’s 
case, his America First mantra cast doubt on the US commitment to its traditional alliances and 
caused severe tensions and declining trust within them.  His claim to represent directly and work for 
the interests of ordinary Americans who suffered from the economic “carnage” over which his 
predecessor allegedly presided threatened to lead to the embrace of protectionism or even 
mercantilism in US trade policy.  The effects of the Great Recession, rising inequality, and advancing 
automation on America’s shrinking middle class, especially regionally concentrated in ‘rust belt’ 
states Trump had to (and did) win, created a perfect storm for turning attacks on free trade 
agreements such as NAFTA and TPP into tangible votes and strengthening Trump’s base.  After 
taking office, Trump’s attacks on US manufacturers with planned investments in Mexico, his pledge 
to revive US coal mining, and blockage of appointments to the judicial apparatus of the World Trade 
Organisation had tangible effects on private sector planning within the US business community.45   
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 Whether moves even more damaging to the liberal international economic order are 
forthcoming is unclear at time of writing.  Astonishingly, in the teeth of the crisis over North Korea’s 
nuclear threats, reports circulated in autumn 2017 that Trump was considering abrogating the US 
bilateral free trade agreement with South Korea, a step that would have obviously negative strategic 
consequences.46  US trade policy professionals were then shocked by a memo written by the top 
Trump trade advisor, Peter Navarro (previously co-author of polemical works such as Death by 
China47), that linked declining US manufacturing capability to increases in abortion, spousal abuse, 
divorce, infertility, child poverty, opioid use, and crime on the basis of no data or evidence.48  
Credible reports emerged that Canadian and Mexican trade officials were being told by their US 
counterparts that they should not expect the US to be bound by WTO rules if Washington pulled out 
of NAFTA since the Trump administration failed to accept its constraints, just one sign amongst many 
that it wished to blow up global trade rules in order to shrink America’s trade deficit.49 
 Arguably, however, Trump’s moves on the strategic side have threatened to do even more 
damage to the liberal international order.  On NATO, North Korea, Iran and immigration, bedrock US 
commitments to international cooperation that have remained consistent over more than 60 years 
under administrations of both political parties risk being discarded if Trump thinks it would benefit 
him politically.  The ideological consensus that has underpinned such US commitments is clearly 
fraying, with Democrats far more focused on domestic contestation of Trump’s agenda than its 
foreign policy consequences.  They, like Trump and the Republicans, could no doubt read polls that 
suggested 70 per cent of voters in 2016 wanted the next President to focus on domestic, not foreign 
policy.  No fewer than 62 per cent thought “[s]ince the US is the most powerful nation in the world, 
we should go our own way in international matters, not worrying too much about whether other 
countries agree with us or not”.50  Trump’s laser-like focus on America First as a slogan and agenda 
reflected not only his extraordinary raw political instincts.  It also reflected how unprecedentedly 
fierce partisan contestation of Trump’s domestic political agenda was feeding through to 
disintegration of the US postwar consensus on liberal internationalism and the belief that absolute 
gains were possible by being true to its principles.  Thus far in the Trump-era US domestic political 
arena, there has been no one to defend them. 
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 The problem, of course, is not confined to Trump’s America.  Trump-like nationalist-
populists made gains in 2016-17 in Germany, Austria, France, Norway, Greece, Finland, the 
Philippines and Turkey.  That is not even to mention the consolidation of power of such forces in the 
non-liberal democratic worlds of Hungary, Russia, China and elsewhere.  It remains difficult to judge 
whether the trend is inexorable and unstoppable, with clearly damaging implications for the liberal 
international order.  It could be just the product of a fleeting time when the Great Recession has 
provoked massive discontent in liberal democracies and flattered the models offered by non-
democratic states.  What is undeniable is that 2016 showed that – for now and possibly the 
foreseeable future – liberal internationalism simply does not pay domestically in US democratic 
politics. 
 
Institutions and civil society:  checks on Trump’s agenda? 
The aforementioned work on the “Italianization” of American politics is clear on what divides Italy 
from the US: “if Italy could have weathered the long Berlusconi era without too much lasting 
damage being inflicted upon the vitality of its democracy, then America, with its much more hearty 
network of institutional constraints upon executive power, will prove itself highly capable of 
accommodating its own version with much less difficulty”.51  In short, the US model of democracy 
with its system of checks and balances is likely to limit the eccentricities of a rogue President.  One 
source of constraint arises from the nature of the foreign policy team that any elected President 
must appoint and then rely upon. 
 Trump ran as a Republican Party outsider for the 2016 presidential nomination.  His total 
lack of foreign policy experience meant he had to rely, at first, on amateurs for foreign policy advice.  
As late as August 2016, when Trump had the nomination locked up, no fewer than 50 senior GOP 
foreign policy professionals signed a public letter saying they would not serve in his administration 
because he would “put at risk our country’s national security and well-being”.52  One result was that 
one of Trump’s top foreign policy advisors, Michael Flynn – former head of the US Defense 
Intelligence Agency, forced to resign by Obama because of his strange statements about Islamist 
terrorism – became Trump’s National Security Advisor (NSA).  Flynn was forced to resign again, this 
time as NSA, after 24 days for lying about his paid work for Turkey and contacts with Russian agents.  
Trump, the candidate, was also advised on foreign policy by George Papadopoulos, a 28-year old 
Greek-American who was swept up, as was Flynn, in the federal investigation of Russian interference 
in the 2016 US election, pleading guilty to lying to federal agents about his own contacts with Russia. 
                                                          
51 Clementi et al., “Making America grate again”, 515. 
52 Sanger and Haberman, “50 GOP officials warn Donald Trump”. 
14 
 
 Trump then had little choice but to turn to foreign policy professionals who agreed to serve 
in his administration.  The result was a so-called “axis of adults” who, together, acted to moderate 
his eccentric statements on foreign policy:  James Mattis, a former military general, as Defense 
Secretary; Herbert McMaster, another respected former general as National Security Advisor; and 
Rex Tillerson – former CEO of Exxon/Mobile – as Secretary of State.53  Trump clashed with Tillerson 
over North Korea and other issues, especially after Tillerson reportedly referred to Trump as a 
“moron” in private meetings, leading Trump to challenge Tillerson to an IQ test that Trump was sure 
he could win.  Still, Tillerson brushed off the drama and doggedly insisted that he would pursue a 
diplomatic solution on North Korea up until “the first bombs drop”.  Similarly, Mattis reassured US 
Asian allies that diplomacy remained “our preferred course of action” and that the US commitment 
to deterrence and defending its allies was “ironclad”.  After the May 2017 NATO summit debacle, 
McMaster co-authored a Wall Street Journal article that was widely condemned by US foreign policy 
professionals for claiming (wrongly) that Trump had “reconfirm[ed] America’s commitment to NATO 
and Article 5” at the Brussels summit and baldly denying the existence of a “global community”. 
Trump’s vision of IR instead consisted of “nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses [that] 
engage and compete for advantage”.   Still, the piece took as its title “America first doesn’t mean 
America alone” and declared that “strong alliances and economically thriving partners” were a “vital 
American interest”.54 
 Trump’s America First agenda has also had its roughest edges at least moderated on trade 
policy.  Navarro’s peculiarities, as well as those of trade sceptic Robert Lighthizer, in charge of the 
renegotiation of NAFTA as US Trade Representative, were reined in by more moderate voices.  They 
included Gary Cohn, head of the National Economic Council, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, 
Trump’s chief of staff, John Kelly (another former military general), and even McMaster as NSA.  
Cohn managed to block multiple mooted moves to abrogate NAFTA unilaterally and impose steep 
tariffs on US imports of steel.  Kelly folded the newly-created Office of Trade and Manufacturing 
Policy headed by Navarro into the National Economic Council, thus requiring Navarro to report to 
Cohn.  At a certain point, whatever their political agenda, any US President must come to grips with 
how promises made during an electoral campaign clash with the hard graft of actually governing, 
and turn to foreign policy professionals for workable compromises.  The professional US foreign 
policy community is generally conservative with few sharp differences of view between Republican 
and Democratic operatives.  Consequently, far more continuity than change in policy occurs even 
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when partisan control of the White House changes, and even when a severely partisan figure like 
Trump comes to office.   
 Moreover, other even more institutionalised and powerful constraints on presidential 
prerogative exist in US government, even in foreign policy where that prerogative is often most 
pronounced.  The power of the US courts was on full display when Trump rolled out Executive Order 
13769: the travel ban on seven predominantly Muslim countries.  The ban was repeatedly blocked 
by federal courts over the course of more than a year despite multiple revisions by the Trump 
administration, before finally being put in place.  Trump’s ban on transgender service in the US 
military met much the same fate.  A federal judge blocked its main provisions and additionally 
blasted the President for announcing the policy on Twitter “without any of the formality or 
deliberative processes that generally accompany the development and announcement of major 
policy changes that will gravely affect the lives of many Americans”.55  The Pentagon chose to low-
ball the ban by subjecting it to a “policy review”, before –after multiple court judgments – it 
announced that transgender people would be free to join the US military as from 2018, whatever 
Trump wanted or had said.  
On Iran, Trump’s refusal to certify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 
multilateral nuclear deal, was no more than a Presidential notification to Congress with no legal 
effect.  It was then left up to Congress to decide whether to exit the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions 
on Iran, with little sign on Capitol Hill of much appetite to do so.  One reason was strong support for 
the Iran deal in a statement to Congress by more than 90 top US nuclear scientists including a 
designer of the hydrogen bomb and all three winners of the 2017 Nobel prize in physics.  Stressing 
that Congress bore “momentous responsibilities”, the proclamation dismissed Trump’s call for 
renegotiation of the JCPOA an “unrealistic objective”.56  The scientists were joined in lobbying 
Congress by European parties to the agreement, with the UK, including its Foreign Secretary, Boris 
Johnson, French, German and also EU diplomats working Capitol Hill hard and impressing upon 
dozens of Senators Europe’s united and firm support for the JCPOA.   
 Judging the impact on policy of civil society more broadly speaking – especially in a 
continent-sized, pluralistic country such as the US – is obviously difficult in the best of times.  Still, 
we can reasonably conclude that US businesses with investments or supply chains in Mexico or 
Canada or reliance on imported steel were acting as allies of Cohn or Mnuchin in the Trump 
administration’s internal trade policy debates.  Meanwhile, even Republicans in Congress were 
backstops to the Trump agenda, with John McCain casting the deciding vote on Trump’s failed 
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attempt to repeal Obamacare (the US federal health insurance scheme) and Bob Corker, the chair of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, breaking with Trump on a range of foreign policy 
questions.   
Meanwhile, there have been signs that the Democratic party is emerging from its post-
Hillary malaise.  The Indivisible movement, a grassroots progressive mobilisation movement 
conceived by former Democratic Congressional staff, claimed nearly 6000 local chapters by late 
2017, including in reliably ‘red’, Republican-dominated states such as Idaho and Wyoming.57  The 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee reported that candidate recruitment ahead of the 
2018 mid-term US elections was far ahead of where it was at a similar stage of the electoral cycle 
prior to the 2016 election. 
 In short, the ideological basis on which the US supported and bolstered the postwar liberal 
order is now contested, probably as never before since the end of the Second World War.  The 
Trump administration in many respects seems to have mimicked the George W. Bush administration 
by upsetting the balance of debates between different US foreign policy doctrines and embracing 
both ultra-aggressive Jacksonianism and (on trade) a highly isolationist form of Jeffersonianism.  
Regardless of how lasting Trump’s impact will be, the bipartisanship on foreign policy that led to the 
Marshall Plan, the creation of the UN and NATO, and the progressive strengthening of international 
law on trade and human rights clearly will not reappear anytime soon, if ever.  But where America 
positions itself in the liberal international order is not and will never be where Donald Trump would 
like to position it.   
 
Conclusion 
Whatever Alcaro might have right or wrong, he is on strong ground in claiming that “the liberal order 
is based on a paradox:  US power is what has enabled it, and at the same what has hampered its 
most complete realisation”.58  The paradox points us towards three points by way of conclusion.  The 
first is that Trump’s Presidency in many, perhaps surprising, ways illustrates how continuity often 
trumps change in US foreign policy.  Exceptions prove the rule, which brings to mind the enormously 
powerful shock to the liberal system that occurred on 11 September 2011.  The response of the 
George W. Bush administration did much to undermine the idea that IR should be rules-based and 
seek both peace and justice in equal measure.   
Its utter disregard for established rules – especially conventions on human rights and the 
treatment of foreign prisoners – clearly changed at least at the level of rhetoric and public diplomacy 
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under Obama, who himself could be considered a foreign policy change agent.  But Obama proved 
unable, say, to close Guantanamo Bay.  Leaving aside the Iranian nuclear deal, there is little to cite 
when sifting through Obama’s eight years in power to support the argument he extended or 
strengthened multilateralism.  He and his administration repeatedly made clear their discontent 
with the EU and NATO.  Obama did little or nothing to invest in his own Democratic Party as an 
institutional defender of the liberal order, and – in retrospect – facilitated the groundswell of 
populism that propelled Trump to the White House by neglecting the plight of Americans who 
globalisation had “left behind”.  Obama cannot be held responsible for the rise of Trump.  It is far 
easier to find causation in 9/11 and all that came after it.  But neither did Obama’s Presidency 
accomplish much in terms of making the liberal international order less vulnerable to attack by a 
populist demagogue who could ride dissatisfaction with its effects as part of a successful US 
presidential campaign. 
 Second, the liberal international order may always have been more fragile than it appeared 
in the first decades of the 21st century.  One result was dangerous assumptions about its resilience 
that led, for example, to Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea or Russia’s brazen assertion of 
its interests in Crimea and Syria.  In all of these cases, pushing at the boundaries set by a liberal 
international order may have seemed not to involve unbearable costs.  By this reading, Trump’s 
America is an almost logical consequence of a general US aversion post-9/11 to try to legitimise the 
liberal international order and mitigate the domestic political costs of defending it.  IR theorists who 
privilege structure over agency in their explanations need obviously to re-examine their 
assumptions.  Equally, liberals and constructivists might usefully question their own views about 
how much international society constrains states that violate its norms. 
 Third and finally, the embrace of illiberal nationalism now offers a viable political strategy for 
political leaders for whom the repression of dissent and abandonment of the rule of law is seductive. 
Others have shown that the strategy does not preclude societal gains, especially in terms of 
economic advancement.  Arguably, the liberal international order relies fundamentally on the health 
of liberal democracies, in which politics involves compromise, open debate and respect for rules.  
After all, it was liberal democratic states – with the US in the lead – that built the order in the first 
place.  But illiberal states – including China (witness Xi’s defence of globalisation at Davos) and even 
Russia (given Europe’s energy dependence on the free flow of Russian energy) – are still, perhaps 
unlikely, natural defenders of the liberal international order from which they benefit. 
Ikenberry is surely right to argue that “Trump is less a cause than a consequence of the 
failings of liberal democracy”.59  We are now light years – in political terms - away from an era in 
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which liberal democracy could be termed (by Francis Fukuyama) “the final form of human 
government”.60  It matters that “from a Western perspective, the 2008 meltdown was first and 
foremost an economic event.  The rest of the world, however, regarded 2008 and its aftermath 
through a much wider aperture…the so-called global recession was primarily an Atlantic one”.61  All 
politics is local, and charity begins at home.  The threat to the liberal order posed by the US under 
the Trump administration may be fleeting and temporary (four or fewer years).  But it will not 
disappear until American power is put at the service of its own democracy, which must be renewed 
to become the example to the world that it used to be.  What is perhaps most surprising about the 
rise of Donald Trump is how close that moment, when it happens, might well be. 
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